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

DAN SMOOT

THE TEST BAN TREATY

"A diplomat's words must have no relation to action — otherwise what kind of diplomacy is it? Words are one thing, actions another. Good words are a mask for the concealment of bad deeds. Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water or iron wood." — Stalin, 1913[1]

"It is ridiculous not to know . . . that a treaty is the means of gaining strength." — Lenin, 1918[2]

"There is a glaring contradiction between the imperialists' policy of piling up armaments and their hypocritical talk about peace. There is no such contradiction, however, between the Soviet government's preparations for defense and for revolutionary war and a consistent peace policy . . . .

"The disarmament policy of the Soviet government must be utilized for purposes of agitation . . . . for recruiting sympathizers for the Soviet Union — the champion of peace and Socialism." — Sixth World Congress of the Communist International, 1928 [3]

In March, 1917, the Tsar of all the Russias was forced from his throne and taken into protective custody by revolutionists under the leadership of Aleksandr Feodorovich Kerenski. In November, 1917, the Bolsheviks, a small group of ruthless political gangsters, seized power from Kerenski, murdered the Tsar, and instituted in Russia a blood bath which horrified the civilized world. Nikolai Lenin and Leon Trotski led this orgy of human butchery.

In June, 1918, having terrorized the opposition into silence, Lenin and Trotski attempted to establish formal diplomatic relations with the United States. Their overtures were rejected.

On October 27, 1919, Robert Lansing, Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of State, explained to Congress why it was the policy of the Wilson administration not to recognize the Bolsheviks in Russia:

"The purpose of the Bolsheviks is to subvert the existing principles of government and society the world over, including those countries in which democratic institutions are already established. They have built up a political machine which, by the concentration of power in the hands of a few and the ruthlessness of its methods, suggests the Asiatic despotism of the early Tsars."[4]

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On August 10, 1920, Bainbridge Colby, another Secretary of State under Wilson, explained again our reasons for not recognizing the Soviets:

"We cannot recognize, hold official relations with, or give friendly reception to the agents of a government which is determined and bound to conspire against our institutions; whose diplomats will be the agitators of dangerous revolt; whose spokesmen say that they sign agreements with no intention of keeping them . . . .

"The existing regime in Russia is based upon the negation of every principle of honor and good faith, and every usage and convention underlying the whole structure of international law; the negation, in short, of every principle upon which it is possible to base harmonious and trustful relations, whether of nations or of individuals."[5]

On March 3, 1933, Herbert Hoover's last day in office, Hoover's Under-Secretary of State said:

"This Government has taken the position that it would be unwise for it to enter into relations with the Soviet regime so long as the present rulers of Russia persist in aims and practices in the field of international relations which are inconsistent with international friendship . . . . This Government has been of the opinion . . . that any real or lasting benefit to the people of the United States would not be attained by the establishment of relations with Russia until the present rulers of that country have given evidence that they are prepared to carry out in good faith . . . [their] international obligations."[6]

The next day — March 4, 1933 — Franklin D. Roosevelt was inaugurated President.

On September 21, 1933, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, in a memorandum to President Roosevelt, said:

"As you know, recognition of the present regime in Russia has been withheld by the Government of the United States, on account of the failure of the Soviet government to carry out certain international obligations which are considered essential to the maintenance of friendly and mutually advantageous relations between the United States and Russia. The Soviet government, for instance, has repudiated Russian obligations held by the United States Government and by American citizens, and has confiscated the property of American citizens invested in Russia . . . .

"I am convinced, from the experience of other countries, that, unless we utilize every available means of exerting pressure on the Soviet government in order to obtain a settlement of outstanding problems, there is little likelihood that such problems can be satisfactorily solved."[6]

Roosevelt-Truman-Eisenhower Negotiations

Rejecting the lessons of history and the advice of his own State Department, President Roosevelt invited a Soviet representative to Washington. On November 16, 1933 (after six days and six nights of secret, unrecorded negotiations in the White House with Maxim Litvinov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs), Roosevelt extended diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union.

Roosevelt's State Department began trying to negotiate outstanding differences between the Soviet Union and the United States. Among the differences were American claims totaling 628 million dollars against the Soviet Union for confiscation of American property. In February, 1934, our State Department offered to accept the equivalent of 90 million dollars in settlement of the 628 million dollar Soviet debts. Litvinov rejected the offer, angrily and with expressions of contempt.

During more than a year of negotiations, Litvinov made only one concrete proposal. He said the Soviet Union would pay 100 million of the 628 million dollar indebtedness, *if* the United States would give the Soviets an unconditional, no-interest loan of 200 million.

On January 31, 1935, Cordell Hull wrote the final words on our hopeless efforts to settle the debt question:

"In an effort to arrive at an agreement with the Soviet Government with respect to debts, claims and credits for trade, negotiations were begun more than a year ago in Moscow and continued in Washington . . . .

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"The Government of the United States indicated its willingness to accept . . . a greatly reduced sum, to be paid over a long period of years . . . . To facilitate the placing of orders in the United States by the Soviet Government on a long-term credit basis, the Government of the United States was prepared to make . . . loans to a very large percentage of the credit granted . . . .

"We hoped confidently that this proposal would prove entirely acceptable to the Soviet Government and are deeply disappointed at its rejection . . . . The negotiations which seemed so promising at the start must now be regarded as having come to an end."[6]

We never collected a penny. Yet, during and after World War II, we *gave* the Soviets direct aid totaling $11,464,109,000.00.[7]

President Roosevelt's wartime conferences with Stalin (Tehran in 1943, and Yalta in 1944), and President Truman's conference with Stalin at Potsdam in 1945, gave further proof that it is disastrous for our leaders to make agreements with communists. As a result of our being bound by agreements which Roosevelt and Truman made at these three wartime conferences — and with the Soviets violating agreements which interfered with their plans — the communists, since 1945, have enslaved approximately 800 million people in Europe and Asia.

The communist trick of negotiating agreements which communists ignore but which handicap the other side, was a principal weapon in their conquest of China during the 1945-1949 period. We permitted the communists to use the same trick against us in Korea. Time and again in Korea, when American forces could have destroyed the communists, we would stop our men and engage in truce talks — just as our State Department had forced Chiang Kai-shek to do in China five years before. Each time, the communists would use the truce talks as a cover for bringing up fresh forces and supplies for a "surprise" offensive.

In 1953, when we negotiated the final Korean armistice, we knew the communists had no intention of keeping their pledges, because they had already broken their promise to return all American prisoners.

In 1955, when President Eisenhower was planning a summit meeting with communist leaders at Geneva, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee released to the press a staff study which revealed that treaty breaking is an instrument of Soviet national policy:

"The staff studied nearly a thousand treaties and agreements . . . both bilateral and multilateral, which the Soviets have entered into not only with the United States, but with countries all over the world. The staff found that in the 38 short years since the Soviet Union came into existence, its Government had broken its word to virtually every country to which it ever gave a signed promise. It signed treaties of nonaggression with neighboring states and then absorbed those states. It signed promises to refrain from revolutionary activity inside the countries with which it sought 'friendship,' and then cynically broke those promises. It was violating the first agreement it ever signed with the United States at the very moment the Soviet envoy, Litvinov, was putting his signature to that agreement, and it is still violating the same agreement in 1955 . . . . It keeps no international promises at all unless doing so is clearly advantageous to the Soviet Union."[8]

On October 31, 1958, representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union met for "test ban talks," and agreed to suspend all testing of nuclear weapons, without inspections, while the talks continued. Eisenhower ordered a halt to United States testing, accepting Khrushchev's unsupported promise that he would do likewise.[9]

Week after week, month after month, year after year, the "test ban talks" continued, fruitlessly. The Soviets, busy assimilating information already produced by tests, did not need to make any nuclear shots in the atmosphere; but they went right ahead with underground shots and any other testing they pleased, ignoring their agreement to halt all tests for the duration of the negotiations. Secretly, they made preparations for another series of atmospheric tests, to be conducted when they were ready.

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Eisenhower kept the agreement, however, permitting no American testing or preparation for tests, during the remainder of his administration. Kennedy continued the ban on nuclear testing.

Kennedy and the Nuclear Ban

On August 30, 1961, the Soviets (having completed analyses of their latest series of major atmospheric tests conducted in 1958, just before the "moratorium" began) abruptly announced that they would resume unrestricted testing.

On March 2, 1962, President Kennedy said the Soviets, in their nuclear tests, were pressing hard toward the goal of developing the most desperately needed weapon of our time — a means of destroying attacking enemy rockets before they explode on target. The President said the Soviet tests of 1961 "reflected . . . the trial of novel designs and techniques, and some substantial gains in weaponry." Mentioning the powerful "nuclear attack and defense capability" which the Soviets are developing, the President warned that further Soviets tests would put the free world in grave danger. He said that the United States "cannot make similar strides without testing in the atmosphere as well as underground," and that "in many areas of nuclear weapons research we have reached the point where our progress is stifled without experiments in every environment."[10]

On March 11, 1962, Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, said the United States has "no reasonable prospect" of developing a successful defense against missiles. At the same time, American officialdom generally was reflecting the expressed conviction of the President that the Soviets may be on the point of developing such a defensive weapon.[11]

In view of all this, it was reasonable to assume that the President would order immediate preparations for massive American testing of nuclear weapons. He did not. He ordered a new series of atmospheric tests to be held in the Pacific beginning in late April, 1962 — but promised that the tests would not be conducted if the Soviets would sign a nuclear test ban by mid-April.[12]

The Soviets signed no agreements, and a series of American nuclear tests in the atmosphere began on April 26, 1962 — the first such tests since 1958. But the testing was timid and halting, hobbled by politics and propaganda.[10] Kennedy permitted only a few tests in the atmosphere before again suspending them.

While continuing their testing and developing of nuclear weapons, the Soviets kept pretending that they really wanted to negotiate a test ban agreement. When the Soviet position would "harden," President Kennedy would order preparations for new American nuclear testing; but before any testing occurred, the Soviet position would "soften," and President Kennedy would suspend American testing.[13] This ludicrous situation continued until June, 1963, when President Kennedy suspended all plans for American testing, indefinitely.

On July 25, 1963, W. Averell Harriman signed, in Moscow, a nuclear test ban treaty which he had negotiated with Khrushchev and with Lord Hailsham, Science Minister of Great Britain. The treaty[14] prohibits nuclear testing in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space, but permits underground nuclear testing.

Thus, the treaty is made to order to serve the interests of the Soviet Union. Testing in the atmosphere is necessary for development of a defensive weapon against missiles. The Soviets do not presently need to conduct any more atmospheric tests. Having already done incalculably more atmospheric testing than we have done, the Soviets now claim to have a satisfactory missile killer, and American military authorities generally believe their claim.[15] The United States has no such weapon and no hope of developing one without additional, extensive atmospheric testing. The Soviets need, however, to continue underground nuclear testing to develop tactical weapons in which the United States presently has superiority.

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Kennedy's disarmament experts do not want us to have a defense against Soviet missiles. Such a weapon in American hands, they claim, would cause the Soviets to intensify the arms race.[15] Kennedy has begun a program to disarm the United States of "provocative" weapons (long-range bombers with first-strike capability, and so on) to keep from offending the Soviets and provoking them to further weapons development.[15]

This puts our nation in grave danger. The Soviets can threaten us with missiles against which we have no defense, but can protect themselves against our missiles. When Kennedy completes the reduction of our manned-aircraft systems of defense and offense, we will be at the mercy of the Soviets. Is this a deliberate program to force the schemes of Kennedy's advisers on the nation?

If they can make our nation helpless — render us incapable of making an offensive move or of defending ourselves — we can no longer maintain our national independence. We will be forced to continue foreign aid in the vain and frantic hope of thus buying help from foreign powers. We will be forced to accept disarmament and surrender of our national sovereignty to a world authority. We will be forced to continue the socialization of our economy so that it can be integrated into the economy of a one-world socialist system.

Kennedy and Cuba

On July 24, 1963 (one day before the test ban treaty was signed in Moscow) Cuban refugees confirmed persistent reports that the Soviets have taken over the Isle of Pines and are converting it into a submarine base.[16] The Isle of Pines is a 40-square-mile island in the Caribbean Sea, off the coast of Cuba. It was under American jurisdiction from the end of the Spanish-American War until 1934, when Franklin D. Roosevelt signed a treaty which had the effect of recognizing the island as Cuban territory.

In Cuba, we see once again grim proof of the folly of negotiating with communists. We also see grim proof of the folly of trusting the Kennedy administration to act in the best interests of the United States, or to tell the people the truth about what is going on.

When Kennedy betrayed Cuban freedom fighters at the Bay of Pigs in April, 1961, it was already known that the Soviets were converting Cuba into a missile and submarine base for use against the United States and other nations in the Western Hemisphere. Kennedy, however, claimed to know nothing about this until just before the congressional elections of 1962.

On October 22, 1962 — pretending that he had just learned about Soviet missile bases in Cuba — Kennedy ordered what he called a "quarantine" of the island. The quarantine consisted of a *request* that Khrushchev remove his missiles from Cuba. Khrushchev promised to do so. Kennedy did not permit the boarding and searching of any communist ships, or allow any other sensible steps, to determine whether Khrushchev was keeping the promise. He accepted the word of Khrushchev and of Castro and of communist ship captains that Soviet missiles were being taken out of Cuba and that no more were being brought in. Kennedy ignored intelligence information from the Cuban underground (which has been remarkably detailed and consistently accurate) that the Soviets were increasing the strength of their armed forces and offensive weaponry in Cuba.[17]

Caves along the Cuban coast have been converted into bases for submarines which can fire rockets into American cities. Soviet missiles, once visible to our reconnaissance photographers from the air, have been stored underground in the Cuban hills.

While all of this was going on, President Kennedy was negotiating a test ban treaty with the Soviets — and deceiving the American people about what was happening. For example: On January 24, 1963, President Kennedy (asked at a press conference whether there was any truth to the reports of a Soviet military buildup in Cuba) said:

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"No, we have been conducting continued surveillance . . . . there has not been a military buildup . . . . There is no influx of military equipment . . . . our scrutiny of Cuba is daily."

Ten days later — February 3, 1963 — Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, said "it is possible that Soviet military strength in Cuba is ten times what it was before the missile crisis last October."[18]

The Propaganda Push

The Kennedy administration has organized a propaganda drive to create enough public pressure on the Senate to force ratification of the test ban treaty. The theme of this propaganda is significant. It does not claim that the treaty will do much good, but, rather, assures the people that it will do no harm.

In a joint television interview with W. Averell Harriman, Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, on July 28, 1963, said of the treaty:

"It does not do a great deal . . . . It does not reduce nuclear stockpiles. It does not eliminate nuclear war or the threat of nuclear war. It does not prevent an arms race. But, nevertheless, it helps to impose some limitations and some ceiling upon the arms race . . . . And it may be the turning point . . . in which other questions could be taken up for further exploration."[19]

In permitting the kind of testing which the Soviets need to conduct, while prohibiting the kind the United States desperately needs, the treaty *does* "do a great deal." And there is a great deal more to it than that.

Since the days of Lenin, the Soviets have never considered their treaty promises as binding on themselves. They make treaties for the purpose of hobbling the other side, leaving themselves free to do as they please. As Lenin said: "It is ridiculous not to know . . . that a treaty is the means of gaining strength."

It takes many months to prepare for substantial nuclear testing in the atmosphere. While the treaty is in effect, we will, of course, refrain from making such preparations. Whenever the Soviets anticipate need for further atmospheric testing, they will make preparations. When they are ready, they will either test openly, in arrogant defiance of the treaty; or they will perform their tests in communist China and disclaim responsibility for them.

Here, we may see a reason for the widely publicized "rift" between communist China and the Soviet Union. Khrushchev and Mao Tse-Tung have made a tremendous effort to convince the West that the communist empire is breaking up, because Khrushchev is mild and reasonable in his attitude toward the West, while Mao is militant and unyielding. All of this could be, and probably is, a hoax to trap western liberals into open support of Khrushchev, who (when not engaged in playing the role of hero in the farce which features Mao as villain) pushes forward relentlessly with his program to bury the West.

The farce has already caused gullible western liberals to feel that we can trust Khrushchev and that we ought to please and appease him, to keep him on our side and, thus, widen the split between the Soviet Union and communist China. Note, for example, W. Averell Harriman repeating Khrushchev's assurance that communist China is not likely to do any nuclear testing because she does not have the capability and is getting no help from the Soviets.[20] Harriman reported these Khrushchev remarks as if they had come from an honorable man whom the West can believe and trust.

Storm The Senate To Reject The Treaty

Secretary Rusk was accurate in saying that the test ban treaty "may be the turning point," opening the way for further negotiations and agreements. This is the main reason why the Senate should *not* ratify the treaty.

If the treaty is ratified, there will be no consequences perceptible to the public. But there will be a violent rash of propaganda about the "break in the cold war," and the wisdom and hopefulness of further agreements to eliminate

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the danger and crushing burden of the armaments race. Step by step, communist overlords will negotiate us into a state of total helplessness, and then force us into total surrender.

If the program were attempted all at once, the people of America might perceive, and would rebel. But if the program is begun through the innocuous-looking test ban treaty, and continued by steps which seem like nothing more than efforts at international understanding, we will have passed the point of no return before the American public realizes it.

The time to act is now. Every American should wire his United States Senators and urge his friends to do the same. The public should storm the Senate with demands that it reject the test ban treaty.

Senate refusal to ratify the treaty would save us from this particular trap, and would be a stunning repudiation of what Senator Strom Thurmond calls the Kennedy administration's no-win policy.

FOOTNOTES

(1) "Elections in Petersburg," (January 12, 1913) *Sochineniya,* Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1946, Vol. II, p. 277

(2) "Reply on Debate on War and Peace," (1918), *Selected Works,* International Publishers, New York, 1943, Vol. VII, p. 309

(3) "Theses Resolutions of the VIth World Congress of the Communist International," *International Press Correspondence,* Vol. 8, No. 84, November 28, 1928, pp. 1590, 1596-7

(4) "Letter From The Secretary Of State Transmitting To The Senate Committee On Foreign Relations, A Memorandum On Certain Aspects Of The Bolshevist Movement In Russia," (October 27, 1919) *Bolshevist Movement in Russia,* Senate Documents, Vol. 4, Doc. No. 172, 66th Congress, 2nd Session, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1920, p. 3

(5) "The Secretary of State to the Italian Ambassador (Avezzana)" August 10, 1920, *Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States,* 1920, Vol. 3, Department of State, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1936, pp. 468, 466

(6) *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers: The Soviet Union,* United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1952, pp. 4, 12-13, 172-3

(7) *U. S. Foreign Aid: Its Purposes, Scope, Administration, and Related Information,* Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., June 11, 1959

(8) "Foreword," by U. S. Senator James O. Eastland (Democrat, Mississippi), to *Soviet Political Agreements and Results,* A Staff Study, Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Washington, D. C., May 21, 1956, p. VIII

(9) Special to the Times, *The New York Times,* October 31, 1958, p. 1; and Special to the Times from Geneva, by Drew Middleton, *The New York Times,* November 1, 1958, pp. 1, 3

(10) *The Test Ban: An American Strategy of Gradual Self-Mutilation,* by Stefan T. Possony, *Congressional Record,* March 21, 1963, pp. 4358-70

(11) Article by Fred Farris, New York Herald Tribune News Service, *The San Francisco Examiner,* March 12, 1962

(12) *Second Annual Report to Congress,* January 1, 1962—December 31, 1962, U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication No. 14, February, 1963

(13) For a detailed description of this tragic game, see this *Report,* "Disarmament—Part I," "Disarmament—Part II," and "Disarmament—Part III," May 6, 13 and 20, 1963; reprints available.

(14) FULL TEXT OF TEST BAN TREATY: "The governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the 'original parties,'

"Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons,

"Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances,

"Have agreed as follows:

"Article I

1. Each of the parties to this treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control:

"A. In the atmosphere, beyond its limits, including outer space, or under water, including territorial waters or high seas; or

"B. In any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. It is understood in this connection that the provisions of this subparagraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground the conclusions of which, as the parties have stated in the preamble to this treaty, they seek to achieve.

"2. Each of the parties to this treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect referred to in paragraph 1 of this article.

"Article II

"1. Any party may propose amendments to this treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the depositary government which shall circulate it to all parties to this treaty. Thereafter, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the parties, the depositary governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the parties, to consider such amendment.

"2. Any amendment to this treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the parties to this treaty, including the votes of all the original parties. The amendment shall enter into force for all parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of the parties, including the instruments of ratification of all of the original parties.

"Article III

"1. This treaty shall be open to all states for signature. Any state which does not sign this treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

"2. This treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory states. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the governments of the original parties—the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—which are hereby designated the depositary governments.

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"3. This treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all the original parties and the deposit of their instruments of ratification.

"4. For states whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

"5. The depositary governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding states of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of and accession to this treaty, the date of its entry into force and the date of receipt of any requests for conferences or other notices.

"6. This treaty shall be registered by the depositary governments pursuant to article 102 of the charter of the United Nations.

"Article IV

"This treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

"Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other parties to the treaty three months in advance.

"Article V

"This treaty of which the English and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the depositary governments. Duly ceritified copies of this treaty shall be transmitted by the depositary governments to the governments of the signatory and acceding states.

"In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this treaty."

(15) "Is U. S. Giving Up In The Arms Race?" article, *U. S. News & World Report,* August 5, 1963, pp. 37-42

(16) "Group Says Isle of Pines Under Control of Russians," article by Robert E. Baskin, Washington, *The Dallas Morning News,* July 25, 1963, p. 1

(17) For a detailed account of Kennedy's handling of the Cuban situation, see this *Report,* "War And Politics," October 29, 1962; reprints still available.

(18) "Cuba Buildup Danger Cited," UPI dispatch from Washington, *The Dallas Times Herald,* February 4, 1963, p. 1

(19) "Pact 'Doesn't Do Much,' Says Rusk," UPI dispatch from Washington, *The Dallas Morning News,* July 29, 1963, p. 1

(20) "Red Said Doubtful Of China A-Power," UPI dispatch from Washington, *The Dallas Times Herald,* July 29, 1963, p. 1

WHO IS DAN SMOOT?

Born in Missouri, reared in Texas, Dan Smoot went to SMU in Dallas, getting BA and MA degrees in 1938 and 1940. In 1941, he joined the faculty at Harvard as a Teaching Fellow in English, doing graduate work for a doctorate in American Civilization.

In 1942, he left Harvard and joined the FBI. As an FBI Agent, he worked for three and a half years on communist investigations in the industrial Midwest; two years as an administrative assistant to J. Edgar Hoover on FBI headquarters staff in Washington; and almost four years on general FBI cases in various parts of the nation.

In 1951, Smoot resigned from the FBI and helped start Facts Forum. On Facts Forum radio and television programs, Smoot spoke to a national audience, giving *both* sides of controversial issues.

In July, 1955, he resigned and started his present independent publishing and broadcasting business — a free-enterprise operation financed entirely by profits from sales: sales of *The Dan Smoot Report,* a weekly magazine; and sales of a weekly news-analysis broadcast, to business firms, for use on radio and television as an advertising vehicle. The *Report* and the broadcast give only *one* side in presenting documented truth about important issues — the side that uses the American Constitution as a yardstick. The *Report* is available by subscription; and the broadcasts are available for commercial sponsorship, anywhere in the United States.

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